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A core objective of the British Neuroscience Association (BNA) 
is to promote and support credibility in neuroscience. Creeping 
changes in the research culture have created a major problem for 
science today. Historically, scientific data that were dramatic, 
novel and positive had been valued and rewarded much more 
highly than incremental, reproduced or null results. Although 
novel and positive results are indeed to be celebrated, doing so at 
the cost of ignoring replication studies or null findings has led to 
a marked reduction in reproducible, replicable and reliable sci-
ence research (Fanelli, 2010, 2012).
While the issue of scientific credibility is now being addressed 
by many research councils, institutes and journals, which support 
and adopt credibility initiatives, the archaic ‘publish or perish’ atti-
tude still resonates throughout our neuroscience community. 
Neuroscience can learn much from fields that have already turned 
the credibility spotlight on themselves (e.g. Psychology), as well as 
organisations such as the Centre for Open Science (COS, USA) and 
the UK Reproducibility Network (UKRN) who seek to increase the 
‘openness, integrity, and reproducibility of scientific research’.
Over the coming years, a core objective of the BNA is to pro-
mote and support credibility in neuroscience, facilitating a cul-
tural shift away from ‘publish or perish’ towards one which is 
best for neuroscience, neuroscientists, policymakers and the pub-
lic. Among many of our credibility activities, we will lead by 
example by ensuring that our journal, Brain and Neuroscience 
Advances, exemplifies scientific practices that aim to improve 
the reproducibility, replicability and reliability of neuroscience 
research. To support these practices, we are implementing some 
of the Transparency and Openness Promotion (TOP) guidelines, 
including badges for open data, open materials and preregistered 
studies. The journal also offers the Registered Report (RR) article 
format. In this editorial, we describe our expectations for articles 
submitted to Brain and Neuroscience Advances.
Reproducibility, replicability and 
reliability
Three fundamental markers of credibility are the reproducibil-
ity, replicability and reliability of neuroscience research. We 
mainly refer to reproducibility and replicability in this editorial 
– but to aid understanding it is important to first describe these 
three terms. As the terms reproducibility and replicability are 
often used interchangeably, it is useful to define them sepa-
rately. An analysis can be defined as reproducible if an inde-
pendent researcher can obtain the same numerical results when 
provided with data and code from the original study (Peng, 
2015). An effect is defined as replicable if a new experiment, 
following the exact protocol that led to the original result, pro-
duces results similar to the original ones. Replicability thus 
depends in part on the reproducibility of the methods and is also 
less clearly defined than reproducibility because it depends on 
defining an acceptable level of similarity for two results. 
Finally, reliability mainly relates to the accuracy of the scien-
tific tools employed.
Data and code sharing
The cornerstone of reproducibility is the availability of data and 
analysis code. While we are not making data sharing compul-
sory, we request that every article contains a data sharing state-
ment, indicating where the data and analysis code can be 
downloaded. If data are not available, a reason for not sharing 
must be provided. Sharing on demand by contacting the authors 
is not a viable option in the short or the long term and will not be 
accepted as a valid statement (Houtkoop et al., 2018). Articles 
providing a URL or DOI to a third-party public repository con-
taining their data and analysis code will be flagged by an ‘Open 
data’ badge.
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Transparent reporting
Transparent reporting is key to replicability, starting with a clear 
description of sample sizes involved at every level of analysis 
(Weissgerber et al., 2016). For instance, the number of subjects 
and the number of measurements per subject should be justified 
and described in the Methods section. Sample sizes should also 
be clearly indicated in figures or figure captions and for each 
analysis, unless sample size is constant across all analyses. 
Articles providing a URL or DOI to a third-party public reposi-
tory containing their experimental materials will be flagged by an 
‘Open material’ badge. Materials are field dependent and could 
include, for instance, auditory stimuli and the code to present 
them to participants, or a detailed lab notebook describing all the 
steps carried out at the bench.
To let readers assess the results, as much as possible we 
request detailed illustrations of the observations, irrespective of 
the outcome of statistical analyses. In particular, we do not accept 
bar and line charts that hide distributions of observations and 
valuable information about the nature of the effects (Rousselet 
et al., 2016; Weissgerber et al., 2015). We expect authors to take 
advantage of modern software to make the most of their data and 
convey an informative and nuanced description of the results to 
the readers (Rousselet et al., 2017; Wickham, 2016). Enough 
information must also be provided about the statistical tests per-
formed (Weissgerber et al., 2018).
Transparent contribution reporting
They are many ways authors could have contributed to an article. 
To recognise and acknowledge this diversity, a Contributions 
section must list the specific roles of everyone involved. To help 




The first step in reporting statistical analyses is to describe the 
results in detail using graphical representations. In many situa-
tions, detailed graphs are sufficient to characterise a dataset with-
out also presenting statistical tests, especially if the goal of a 
study is to estimate the size of an effect. Along with others, we 
believe that a focus on estimation is the most productive way to 
conduct and report statistical analyses (Cumming, 2014; 
Kruschke and Liddell, 2018).
Analysis
Whatever the graph choices, authors must justify them explic-
itly, as well as the choice of statistical tests, alpha level for error 
control, sample size and hypotheses tested (Lakens et al., 2018). 
Common choices include using t-tests on means, alpha = 0.05 
and a null hypothesis, but these choices are often inappropriate. 
In particular, many types of variables quantified in neuroscience 
projects violate the core assumptions of techniques such as 
standard t-tests, analyses of variance (ANOVAs), correlations 
and regressions, potentially leading to lower statistical power or 
increased false positives; robust statistics can address these 
issues and help provide a better understanding of the data 
(Wilcox and Rousselet, 2018). Relying on standard techniques 
can also lead to inaccurate sample size estimation when plan-
ning for statistical power. Sample size does not need to be justi-
fied based on statistical power: another approach is to focus on 
estimation accuracy (Peters and Crutzen, 2017; Rothman and 
Greenland, 2018).
Significance
Adding the qualifier ‘significant’ or ‘not significant’ after a p 
value does not add any information. It only provides a false sense 
of certainty that no statistical technique can provide (Gelman, 
2018). Instead, readers should be provided with sufficient infor-
mation to decide for themselves what they think of the results. 
Indeed, the American Statistical Association’s (ASA) statement 
on p values clearly state that ‘Scientific conclusions and business 
or policy decisions should not be based only on whether a p-value 
passes a specific threshold’ (Wasserstein and Lazar, 2016). In 
addition to p values, authors should consider carefully the infor-
mation provided by effect sizes, confidence intervals and other 
sources of information, and put that information in context 
(Amrhein et al., 2018; McShane et al., 2017).
Going beyond p values, assessing the practical significance of 
research findings is critical, in part because it is trivial to achieve 
‘significance’ from noisy measurements or large collections of 
samples, even in the absence of underlying effects (Loken and 
Gelman, 2017). The problem gets worse with many implicit or 
explicit researchers’ degrees of freedom (Forstmeier et al., 2016; 
Simmons et al., 2011). And when dealing with small samples, 
filtering by significance leads to inflated effect sizes, or even 
effect sizes in the wrong direction – the so-called type M and type 
S errors (Gelman and Carlin, 2014). A more productive approach 
is to describe the methods and results in as much detail as possi-
ble, share data and code and let readers make their own mind 
about the results, without forcing artificial dichotomies on the 
readers. In particular, we request that authors declare if all meas-
ures and statistical analyses have been reported.
Registered reports
The introduction of the RR format aims to improve the reproduc-
ibility and replicability of neuroscience research. A thorough 
description of RR is available on the Open Science Framework 
(OSF) website (https://cos.io/rr/), in particular this FAQ (https://
osf.io/gha9f/). In short, unlike standard research articles, RRs 
have been designed to minimise questionable research practices 
(such as p-hacking and HARKing) as well as the publishing 
incentives that promote them (Chambers et al., 2015). The RR 
format is applicable to standard studies, replication studies and 
studies planning the analysis of existing datasets. At the core of 
RR is an innovative reviewing process, in which the Introduction 
and Methods sections are reviewed before the research is carried 
out. Articles are thus evaluated solely based on the importance of 
the topic and the quality of the research methods and analyses, 
not based on the results. Thus, RRs offer a great way to improve 
experimental methods to make the most out of lab resources by 
getting feedback from experts when it matters most: before data 
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collection, not after. Receiving feedback from the scientific com-
munity prior to commencing the actual experiments helps 
improve experimental designs, the choice of tools, data quantifi-
cation methods and statistical tests. We all make mistakes or are 
unaware of better alternatives, or both, and this should not be 
demonised – instead we should work together to find solutions, 
make the best of our limited resources, which in turn will increase 
the reproducibility, replicability and reliability of our studies.
Proposals of sufficient quality are approved to progress to the 
data collection stage. Providing the authors followed the methods 
discussed and agreed during stage 1 and reached sensible conclu-
sions about the results, the article is accepted for publication no 
matter how the results turned up.
This two-step process clearly delineates exploratory from 
confirmatory research (Forstmeier et al., 2016; Wagenmakers 
et al., 2012), such that readers can trust a study does not suffer 
from p-hacking and HARKing for instance (Kerr, 1998; Simmons 
et al., 2011). RRs incorporate other critical features aimed at 
boosting research credibility, for instance, mandatory data and 
code sharing for reproducibility, and the demand for at least 90% 
power to improve replicability.
Why 0.9 power and not the more traditional 0.8? Both are 
completely arbitrary values. But let us look at this choice from 
the perspective of replicability: ‘Studies are often designed or 
claimed to have 80% power against a key alternative when using 
a 0.05 significance level, although in execution often have less 
power due to unanticipated problems such as low subject recruit-
ment. Thus, if the alternative is correct and the actual power of 
two studies is 80%, the chance that the studies will both show 
P ⩽ 0.05 will at best be only 0.80(0.80) = 64%; furthermore, the 
chance that one study shows P ⩽ 0.05 and the other does not 
(and thus will be misinterpreted as showing conflicting results) 
is 2(0.80)0.20 = 32% or about 1 chance in 3’ (Greenland et al., 
2016). With 90% power, the chance that the two studies will 
show p ⩽ 0.05 will at most be 0.90(0.90) = 81%. This is much 
better than 64%, although it still leaves the door open for a large 
amount of apparent discrepancies among studies if the outcomes 
are judged solely on the basis of p values. Also, power estima-
tion typically assumes that the data do not violate tests’ expecta-
tions and that there are no measurement noise and other sources 
of variability beyond random sampling. As such, the actual 
power of a line of research will necessarily be lower than antici-
pated. Hence, we feel that aiming for at least 90% power is 
entirely justified, given that in practice power will tend to be 
lower.
Preregistration
In addition to RR, the journal welcomes the submission of pre-
registered work, for instance, using the OSF. Unlike RR, prereg-
istered studies are not reviewed before data collection or data 
analysis. Preregistration affords only some of the benefits of RR: 
most notably it allows a clear demarcation between confirmatory 
and exploratory analyses; it also enhances the discoverability of 
research that might not be ultimately published. If authors can 
provide a public time-stamped document describing their experi-
mental design and analysis protocol, dated before the start of data 
collection or data examination, their articles could be awarded a 
‘Preregistered’ badge. A badge can also be obtained when only 
the analyses are preregistered.
Exploratory research
By promoting RR and confirmatory research, we do not imply 
that exploratory research should be discouraged. High-quality 
exploratory research is necessary to the research enterprise by 
providing useful results that can be used to build theories and gen-
erate hypotheses, which in turn can be tested using a confirmatory 
approach (McIntosh, 2017). After all, some of the best work in 
neuroscience was exploratory, for instance, the Nobel Prize work 
of Hubel and Wiesel: ‘Looking back, Hubel considered that their 
research “was by and large a huge fishing trip”’ (Martin, 2014).
More suboptimal is to present exploratory research as con-
firmatory, because while it is easy to obtain ‘significant’ results 
and to write post hoc stories about them, such findings do not 
tend to replicate and thus undermine the credibility of research. 
Adding p values to exploratory findings cannot make them more 
than what they are, certainly not turn them into confirmatory 
results. In fact, p values can be difficult to interpret for explora-
tory research (Kruschke and Liddell, 2018; Wagenmakers, 2007).
While we currently do not offer an exploratory report format, 
we welcome submission of high-quality exploratory work, on its 
own, or as part of a stage 1 RR submission. Exploratory research 
should be presented without p values or confidence intervals.
A bright future for neuroscience
By creating a format that encourages transparent reporting 
(including negative results), rigorous statistical analyses, sharing 
at all stages of discovery and highlighting individual authors’ 
contributions, we hope to increase the reproducibility, replicabil-
ity and reliability of the research published in Brain and 
Neuroscience Advances and provide benefits to all involved. We 
also encourage other neuroscience (and non-neuroscience) jour-
nals to continue to adopt these initiatives. It is only when we 
work together as a neuroscience community that we will achieve 
more productive and beneficial investigations – and in turn 
improve the trust of the public in our research.
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